mid east

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NEW YORK TIMES DATE 24 OCT 73 PAGE 19

# A Large Russian Group Directing and Assessing

By DREW MIDDLETON

The Middle East war has become a vast test range for Soviet military equipment from highly sophisticated antiaircraft and antitank missiles to the newest battle tanks, Western military sources believe.

The performance of these weapons systems is being directed and assessed by a sizable body of Soviet military advisers and technicians, the sources added. The International Institute for Strategic Studies in London estimates that there are 1,000 Soviet advisers and instructors in Egypt, 3,000 in Syria and 1,500 in Iraq, the three main combatants on the Arab side.

American technical advisory forces in Israel are said to number no more than 50.

The main Arab armies and air forces also are testing battle tactics that the Soviet Army has practiced in Eastern Europe for the last 25 years. The initial Egyptian crossing of the Suez Canal on Oct. 6, sources said, closely followed tactical procedures established for Soviet froces in Eastern Europe.

### A Variety of Equipment

The variety of the equipment being tested, the sources said, needs that tried out by the Germans, Italians and Russians in the Spanish Civil War of the nineteen-thirties. In that conflict both the loyalist forces and the insurgent froces led by Gen. Francisco Francos relied heavily on foreign regular troops and volunteers.

Foreign manpower, either military or volunteer, has played less important role in the Middle East war. Soviet personnel have not been found to be in combat roles, but the Arabs have reportedly had help from North Korean pilots flying Egyptian MIG-21's, and North Vietnamese advisers are reported to be with the Syrian forces. The North Vietnamese, intelligence sources believe, are helping the Syrians on the stationary sites for the SAM-2 and SAM-3 missiles.

Soviet weaponry in the Mid-East conflict has been relatively simple to operate, durable in conditions and, in most cases, comparatively simple to maintain, military sources said.

Pavel Damchenko, the principal Arabist of Pravda, the Soviet party newspaper, credited early Arab successes to the excellence of their Soviet weapons and there is a good deal of agreement with that view in Washington and London.

### Missile Is a Surprise

The SAM-6 surface-to-air missile has been the major surpriset of the war. A low-level missile with three launchers carried on a tracked vehicle, it has been highly effective against Israeli aircraft and Israeli technology develops be effective until United States and Israeli technology develop electronic measures to jam and confuse its radar guidance system.

The radar equipment is carried on a second tracked vehicle. The crew plots the target aircraft on the screen while a second device receives signals from a beacon in the rear of the missile enabling the operators to alter its course.

By bringing the two blips—the target blip and that activated by the beacon—together, the crew can guide the missile to the enemy aircraft.

It appears that if the radar equipment is destroyed or fails, the SAM-6 has a built-in infrared guidance system that steers the missile toward the nearest source of engine heat.

The United States, as much interested as Israel in solving the SAM-6 problem because it represents a serious threat, is shipping a new surface to air missile, the Standard developed for the Navy, to Israel to bolster her air defenses.

Also threatening the Israelis and apparently effective when used by steady troops is the SAM-7. A shoulder-fired, low-level anti aircraft missile, it was used successfully by the North Vietnamese in the Indochina war.

Soviet equipment and—to an undetermined degree — United States equipment have played an important role in tank battles.

The most important Soviet contribution has been the Sagger antitank missile. This is a mobila weapon, a 120-mm. rocket with a warhead of more than five pounds directed by infrared rays. Israelis admit that it has knocked out a number of their tanks.

Neutral sources have reported the arrival on the battlefield of a wire-guided American antitank missile. This may be the TOW missile, which can be fired from the ground or from a helicopter and which has proved extremely effective in United States Army tests.

The war has been the first test for the new Soviet main battle tank, the T-62. Egypt had 100 of these 37-ton tanks when the war began. The T-62, which reached the Soviet Army eight years ago, is armed with a 115-mm. gun, which with a laser range finder.
nations.

The American TOW missile was designed with the T-62 in mind. The Israelis say that several of the tanks have been knocked out, and American technical officers are anxiously awaiting reports on the efficiency of guns and missiles against this tank.

### Frog Missile Captured

The Israelis also have captured a three-ton Frog-7 surface-to-surface missile of the type they say was used to hit civilian settlements in central Galilee. This missile fires an 1,100-pound warhead a distance of 45 miles.

Soviet military technology in the past decade has emphasized construction of lighter armored vehicles for reconnaissance and support operations. The Israelis have captured two late models. One is the BRDM-1, a light amphibious armored patrol car weighing seven tons and equipped with a fifth wheel for maneuvering on difficult ground. The other is the BTR-60 amphibious armored personnel carrier. It weighs 10 tons, is armed with machine guns and antiaircraft weapons and can carry a dozen fully armed infantrymen.

Western military sources also stressed that the Soviet airlift to Egypt, Syria and Iraq has given the expanding Soviet air transport service more experience. Expert opinion regards the development of this service as one of the most significant military steps taken by the Russians because the fleet of transports, including the relatively new Antonov-22, extends [illegible] intervention on behalf of client nations such as Egypt and Syria.

## Advanced Soviet MIG's Reported Over Egypt

Reports in Israel transmitted to Washington say that Soviet MIG-25 fighters have been sighted at extreme altitudes over Egypt.

The MIG-25, a modification of the MIG-23, is the most advanced fighter in the Soviet inventory. MIG-25's have not been allowed out of Russian hands; none have been turned over to the Egyptian or East German, Polish and other Warsaw Pact air forces.

Western military circles officials believe that any MIG-25's flown over Egypt are flown by Soviet pilots. The aircraft has a speed of Mach-3, or three times the speed of sound, and a ceiling of 90,000 feet.

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THE WASHINGTON POST DATE 26 Oct 73 PAGE 1

**Change in Airlift, Note From Brezhnev**

# Soviet Moves Caused U.S. Military Alert

By Michael Getler
Washington Post Staff Writer

The pre-dawn alert yesterday of American military forces around the world came after 48 hours of puzzling yet potentialy dangerous signals that the Soviet Union was planning to intervene unilaterally in the Middle East fighting.

As high-ranking U.S. officials explain it, the first unusual event came on Tuesday when there was a sharp drop-off in the previously heavy Russian airlift of supplies into Egypt and Syria.

At about the same time, U.S. intelligence reportedly began picking up initial indications that some Russian army and transport units had been placed on alert.

These two events, plus a continuation of the already heavy Soviet sealift of supplies to the war zone, led to the troublesome speculation shared by many top civilian and military officials that the Soviet Union was planning some sort of military move in the Middle East.

It was reasoned that the airlift of cargo had ended abruptly because enough material was under way by ship and the transport planes were being readied to carry the troops that had been alerted.

The mood of impending crisis deepened Wednesday when further alerts were detected reportedly involving Russian airborne units. Then flights of "several" of the huge Soviet AN-22 transports were detected heading for Cairo from bases believed to be in Eastern Europe.

The conclusion, however, remained tenuous until Wednesday night, when Soviet Ambassador Anatoliy F. Dobrynin delivered what senior officials describe as a "harshly worded" letter from Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev to President Nixon, through Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger. The note reportedly warned that Russian troops would be sent to the Middle East in a unilateral action if necessary to enforce the on-again, off-again cease-fire.

The Dobrynin note, in combination with the earlier signals, convinced the Joint Chiefs of Staff and top civilian leaders that Moscow

See ALERT, A16, Col. 1

Council and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The actual order to move to a higher state of readiness went out from the joint chiefs, on orders of the Secretary of Defense, between midnight and the early hours of Thursday morning.

The alert was to put all forces on fundamentally a standby basis and was far from two much higher levels of alert that would accompany a prelude to all-out war. Principally it meant leaves were canceled, men were ordered to return to their units and be prepared to move out if necessary.

There were some dramatic aspects, however, including the dispatch of a third U.S. attack aircraft carrier, the John F. Kennedy, into the Mediterranean from its post in the Eastern Atlantic, where it had been stationed for several days.

Also, about 50 or 60 B-52 heavy bombers were ordered to return from their base at Guam to the United States. The planes had been part of a 150-plane B-52 force on Guam used during the Vietnam war, but many of the later "G" models of these planes still play a primary role in the nuclear deterrent force.

Arab and possibly Soviet assessments early in the war that Arab forces would do well had clearly begun to crumble by early this week when the Israeli thrust across the Suez Canal split the Egyptian forces in two and trapped the elite Egyptian Third Army.

After an investment of billions of dollars by the Soviet Union in Egypt's military machine, it was faced early this week with the prospect of a severe and embarrassing defeat for the Russian-trained and equipped Egyptian army.

The Israeli reponse to alleged cease-fire violations was to pound the Third Army even harder, grab more territory and further isolate that force. Without some intervention or threat, it may have been felt in Moscow that the Third Army, which is the backbone of the Egyptian ground force, would have been annihilated, carrying with it the message that no amount of Russian help could prevent humilating defeat by the Israelis.

The United States, however is also believed to have presumably will be left to the negotiations that the United States hopes will eventually begin between the Arabs and Israelis.

Yesterday's alert of U.S. forces worldwide is believed to be the first time such an alert was flashed since the 1968 capture of the USS Pueblo by the North Koreans.

In contrast to the 1970 Middle East crisis, in which only selected U.S. units were alerted, yesterday's action applied to all forces — air, sea and ground as well as both conventional and nuclear forces.

The United States has five levels of alert, with the most relaxed being Level 5 and the normal being Level 4.

Yesterday, the U.S. forces were ordered to Level 3, which is a higher state of readiness and which means, for example, that the Strategic Air Command would have more of its pilots ready for duty than under normal circumstances.

U.S. officials say yesterday's dramatic action "had a heavy dose of diplomacy in it."

As they describe it, the apparent imminence of the

The U.S. Sixth Fleet now numbers more than 50 vessels, including three attack carriers with about 250 planes in total and two helicopter carriers with a combined load of 3,500 to 4,000 Marines.

In contrast to the U.S. fleet, which has considerable offensive capabilities, the Russian fleet is designed more to do battle with the Sixth Fleet and protect shipping lanes than to put men or planes ashore.

A number of military observers, in fact, view the Russian military situation in the Middle East as not too unlike the problems faced by the Soviet Union in the Cuban missile crisis of 1962 and in responding to the U.S. mining of North Vietnamese ports in 1972.

Despite the heavy flow of Russian arms to the Middle East, these observers believe the Soviet Union still does not have the kind of conventional striking power that the United States has particularly in the form of long-range fighter-bombers and aircraft carriers—which enables a superpower to fight major battles at great distances from its homeland.

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NEW YORK TIMES DATE 26 Oct 73 PAGE 28

# Kissinger Says Action Is Expression of Policy

By JOHN W. FINNEY
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Oct. 25 — An alert of airborne troops within the Soviet Union combined with a Soviet threat to send forces into the Middle East was cited by military officials today as the reason the United States placed its forces on a worldwide alert.

The alerting of the American forces today was described by the Defense Department as a "precautionary" move. At a news conference some 12 hours after the alert was ordered, Secretary of State Kissinger made it clear that the purose of the Pentagon's move was to underscore American opposition to introduction of Soviet troops into the Middle East.

The alert order was dispatched from the Pentagon's National Military Command Center shortly after midnight and signed by Adm. Thomas H. Moorer, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, acting under instructions from Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger. The effect was to place the forces on a stand-by alert.

### Effect of Soviet Moves

Preceding that order, according to Administration officials, were Soviet diplomatic and military moves that led American policy makers, meeting throughout most of the night at the White House, the Defense and State Departments, to conclude that the Russians were preparing to send forces into the Middle East over American opposition.

The crisis atmosphere began to set in at the White House yesterday afternoon. Until that time, Mr. Kissinger said, at his news conference, "we had every reason to believe that the basic direction had been established" and that "all parties" were moving in the direction of putting into effect the cease-fire in place that the United Nations Security council had called for.

But then, in the view of the Administration, a disturbing new element was introduced. President Anwar el-Sadat of Egypt proposed yesterday afternoon that the United States and Soviet Union contribute troops to a joint peace-keeping force.

The immediate White House reaction had been to reject the Sadat proposal, but in a low-keyed way, through a statement by a Presidential spakesman.

But then the Soviet Union took up the proposal and reportedly sent a note to the United States late yesterday afternoon or evening. From the comments of various Administration officials and certain members of Congress, it appears that the Soviet Union threatened in the note to send troops to the Middle East itself if the United States would not agree to a joint peace-making force.

### Ambiguity and Action

At his noontime news conference, Mr. Kissinger said that it was the abiguity of some of the Soviet "actions and communications and certain readiness measures that were observed that caused the President at a special meeting of the National Security Council last night at 3 A.M. to order certain precautionary measures to be taken by the United States."

Among the "readiness measures" observed, Administration officials said, was an alert order to some 40,000 Soviet airborne troops that had been moved in the past week to potential staging areas in the southern Soviet Union. The inference draw by Administration officials was that these troops were being alerted for movement by planes to Egypt.

Just how the United States learned of the alert order was not disclosed, but there were hints by officials that the Soviet Union deliberately let it be known that the airborne troops had been alerted for movement.

### Troop Airlift Suspected

On top of this information came word that an unusually large number of Soviet AN-22 transports were landing at Egyptian airports. The AN-22 comparable in size with the United States Air Force's C-5A is a huge turboprop plane capable of carrying more than 175 men.

The immediate suspicion was that the Soviet planes were carrying airborne troops, a suspicion compounded by the fact that in the last five days, the Soviet airlift of supplies to Egypt had tapered off as the Soviet Union apparently shifted to ships to get military equipment to the Egyptian forces.

One line of speculation, officials said, was that Moscow had taken the large transports off the matériel airlift and sent them back to the Soviet Union to carry the several airborne divisions that had been alterted.

As it turned out, the Soviet planes were carrying supplies, not troops. This point was confirmed indirectly by Mr. Kissinger, who said at his news conference that the United States was not aware that any Soviet forces had already been introduced into Egypt.

In the early morning hours, however, when the Soviet intentions were being assessed here at the emergency meeting throughout the Government, it was not yet known what the Soviet transports were carrying. Complicating the assessment was the time difference between Cairo and Washington.

Most of the Russian planes were observed coming into Egypt shortly after dawn this morning in Cairo; Cairo is six hours ahead of Washington. Thus, in Washington, information on the Soviet flights was being received around midnight and afterward—or at the same time the National Security Council, which had been meeting in periodic emergency sessions throughout the day, was recommending that a general alert be issued to United States forces

Officials said that the Administration's assessment of soviet intentions was greatly influenced by the diplomatic note from the Soviet Union.

The nature of the Soviet note and how it was delivered have still not been completely made known. At his news conference, Mr. Kissinger refused to discuss the note.

### Jackson Calls Note 'Brutal'

Senator Henry M. Jackson, Democrat of Washington, said at a breakfast meeting with reporters that he had been told about but had not seen the note, which he characterized as "brutal, rough" in tone. Basically, he said, the Soviet Union told the United States that if we didn't do something, they were going in."

The Administration was concerned, according to officials, about the possibility that the Soviet Union might mve in some of its "naval infantry"—the equivalent of the United States Marines—from ships stationed in the Mediterranean. Th Soviet union is beieved to have about 6,000 naval infantrymen there and there were indications that some ships were already in Syrian ports.

The general alert to the American forces was described by Administration officials as more a psychological than a military action, designed to emphasize American opposition to any unilateral move of troops into the Middle East. But in its initial secrecy about he alert, officials acknowledged privately, the Administration may have contributed more to an atmosphere of crisis than had been intended.

As a psychological move, officials suggested that the alert might have achieved its purpose. This afternoon at the United Nations, the Soviet Union supported a proposal calling for a peace-keeping force that would exclude the United States, the Soviet Union and other permanent members of the Security Council.

At the same time, Administration officials conceded that the Soviet Union might have achieved part of its objective in threatening to send forces into the Middle East. At least in part, as analyzed by United States officials, the Soviet objective was to emphasize Egyptian and Russian concern over the plight of the Egyptian II Corps' encircled on the eastern bank of the Suez Canal by Israeli forces since the cease-fire was first proclaimed Monday.

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THE WASHINGTON POST DATE 31 Oct 73 PAGE C23



# Soviet Role in Mideast War Assayed

*By Jack Anderson*

The story is now leaking out of the strained, secret diplomacy that followed the outbreak of hostilities in the Middle East.

In one secret report, the Central Intelligence Agency suggests that the Soviets actually orchestrated the Arab attack. It was part of a desperate maneuver, the CIA quotes an informed source as saying, to hang on to their beachhead in the Middle East.

Before the attack, Egypt had thrown out Soviet military advisers, tightened its ties with Saudi Arabia and shifted toward the West. Even in Syria, which had been the most Moscow-minded of the Arab powers, the Soviets had encountered growing hostility.

Other intelligence reports raise doubts about the precise Soviet role in planning the surprise attack. But the Kremlin clearly had advance knowledge that it was coming.

It has also been established that Soviet military shipments, both by air through Yugoslavia and by water through the Black Sea, started on their way before the guns began booming.

Immediately after the outbreak, President Nixon appealed to Soviet party chief Leonid Brezhnev for restraint. Both the superpowers, urged the President, should keep hands off the Middle East war.

Brezhnev argued that the Arabs had the right to recapture their lost lands and, therefore, that the Soviets couldn't withhold military supplies. Nixon responded that the United States was equally justified in helping Israel repel armed aggression.

Secretary of State Henry Kissinger stressed to Soviet Ambassador Anatoliy Dobrynin that the United States was quite capable of matching Soviet shipments and maintaining the military supply balance in the Middle East.

For four days, the United States held back military shipments to Israel while Kissinger tried to persuade the Russians to exercise similar restraint. However, the Soviet tonnage not only began to pour into Egypt and Syria, but the Russians also beefed up their naval strength in the Mediterranean.

In response, the United States used its superior airlift capacity to catch up with the Soviet shipments. This apparently surprised the Soviet strategists, who had thought the United States wouldn't risk an oil cutoff to support the embattled Israelis.

Intelligence reports claim, meanwhile, that the cautious Egyptian commanders wanted to consolidate their hold on the Suez Canal's east bank but were goaded by the Russians to expand the offensive. Brezhnev also brought personal pressure, according to one report, on Jordan's King Hussein, Morocco's King Hassan and Tunisia's President Habib Bourgubia to join in the fighting.

When the Israelis outmaneuvered the Egyptians by moving across the Suez Canal and cutting the Egyptian supply lines, the Kremlin began showing signs of panic. Another Arab humiliation could backfire on the Soviets, whose role in the debacle could bring them more blame than praise from Arab leaders.

Suddenly, Brezhnev sent President Nixon an urgent message requesting that Kissinger come to Moscow at once to negotiate a cease-fire. Then the Soviets, in their haste to end the fighting, wanted to rush in a joint Soviet-American force to police the cease-fire.

President Nixon rejected the idea of direct superpower involvement in the Middle East. The Soviets apparently mistook this as a delaying tactic and sent a bristling note to the President, threatening to send its own troops to the Middle East to keep the peace. The President reacted by placing the U.S. armed forces on a military alert. Then both of the big powers wisely backed away from a confrontation.

**Grizzly Report**—A secret Interior Department study warns that the nation's grizzly bear population is in danger of extinction because their food supply has been suddenly closed down.

In Yellowstone National Park, the last major stronghold of the big beasts, the grizzlies have fed for years on campers' garbage. Six years ago, a study urged that the dumps be closed gradually so the bears could return to their old eating habits in the wild.

Instead, the National Park Service has shut down the dumps abruptly, thus driving the panicky bears into campsites and off-park lands, where they have been shot.

The new secret study, done by Interior consultants, warns: "The grizzly bear population in Yellowstone Park and surrounding areas has declined rapidly and will continue to do so if conditions remain unaltered."

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THE EVENING STAR DATE 5/04/73 PAGE 1

DEADLY SAM IN ISRAELI HAND

# U.S. to Study Soviet

By Associated Press

The United States will ave access to an advanced oviet-built missile unit aptured by Israel from gypt, sources report.

U.S. government sources y the Israeli army cap- red intact an SA6 antiair- aft system, which inflict- heavy losses on Israel's .S.-equipped air force in first combat test during e latest Middle East war.

he United States has not d access to the SA6 nor d it face it in the Vietnam ar. Pentagon scientists re able to develop coun- measures to most Soviet weapons through the Vietnam experience.

U.S. military officials are anxious to learn in detail how the SA6 operates, and how to foil it, because American planes might have to face it some day in any confrontation with the Soviet Union. It is believed U.S. experts may work with Israeli technicians in studying the system.

**THE SA6, USED** in combination with other Soviet-made antiaircraft weapons, was credited with knocking down roughly half of the more than 100 airplanes Israel lost in fighting the Egyptians and Syrians. Most of the downed planes were U.S.-manufactured F4 Phantom and A4 Skyhawk jets.

The deadly accuracy of the Soviet-built weapons alarmed both Israeli and U.S. military officials because they lacked the electronic equipment to jam or confuse the SA6's sophisticated guidance system.

Experts say the SA6, mounted on tank tracks, is very mobile and is most effective against planes attacking at low level. Many of the Israeli planes destroyed by the SA6 were flying low to strike at Egyptian and Syrian tanks.

**U.S. SOURCES** said an SA6 missile battery, its radar and guidance equipment were s Israeli troo thrust across al into Egypt

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

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NEW YORK TIMES DATE 31 Oct 73 PAGE 1

# War Signals Misjudged, U.S. Officials Concede

By JOHN W. FINNEY
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Oct. 30—United States officials said today that despite several suspicious signals, neither the United States nor Israel seriously believed at the start of October that the Arab countries were about to attack. This view began to change, they went on, when Soviet commercial airliners were diverted, some in midflight, to evacuate Soviet dependents from Egypt and Syria three days before the outbreak of the war.

Such was the prevailing belief that the Arabs would not attack that even the diversion of the Soviet Ilyushin 18 transports was misinterpreted in some United States intelligence circles, the officials added.

The immediate reaction of some intelligence officials was that the Soviet Union had received information that Israel was about to embark on some military operation. And for eight hours after the outbreak of the fourth Middle East war Oct. 6, sizable segments of the United States intelligence community continued to believe that Israel had launched the attack, not the Arabs.

The warning set off by the emergency Soviet evacuation beginning Oct. 3 was described today by officials as they dis-

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cussed the deficiencies that developed in American and Israeli assessments of Arab intentions.

That an intelligence gap developed is now generally acknowledged within the Government, which is going through a re-examination, with interagency squabbles, of the intelligence machinery's operation before and during the war.

It is generally agreed, among United States officials, that the machinery performed well in accumulating facts about Arab military development and capabilities. Where it failed was in judging the facts in terms of Arab intentions.

### Signs Were Misread

Officials now believe there were several signs, going back nearly two years, that Egypt and Syria were preparing for an attack. But almost right up to the outbreak of the war, officials said, these signs were all misread if not ignored, largely because of the prevailing Israeli and American view that the Arab countries, after their humiliating defeat in the 1967 war, would not dare initiate a new war.

As long as a year and a half ago, Israel had obtained detailed photographs of new roads leading to key crossing points on the western bank of the Suez Canal. The pictures also showed that bridge-building equipment supplied by the Soviet Union had been stored near each of the potential crossing points.

Constructed near revetments were large regimental headquarters camps, complete with radar, tanks and ammunition stocks, but manned by few persons.

It is now obvious, officials say, that the Egyptians had prepared for a large-scale assault across the canal and had only to move troops in to carry out the operation.

But when the Israeli photographs were showed at the time to American analysts, the Israeli and American assessment was that a large-scale crossing was challenging beyond the Egyptian Army's capabilities.

As a result, Israel, whose whole military strategy is based on seizing and maintaining the initiative against the numerically superior Arab forces, was taken by surprise by the Egyptian offensiv across the Suez in the earl morning hours of Oct. 6.

Another sign that was largel ignored was the constructio in the last year and before c a forward line of Soviet sur face-to-air anti aircraft mis siles near both the Egyptia and Syrian 1967 cease-fire line with Israel.

It now seems apparent tha the Russians convinced th Egyptian and Syrian militar leaders that if they wanted t launch a large-scale ground at tack, it should be carried ou under an umbrella of Missiles

Largely because of the Amer ican experience in counterin a SAM defense that was les sophisticated and not so dense the implications of the Egyp ian [illegible] missile net works tended to be dismissed.

This misjudgment proved costly for Israel, which suffered heavy aircraft losses in eliminating the SAM defenses on the Syrian front and the SAM system on the western bank of the canal deterred Israel from using her air power to eliminate the Egyptian beachhead on the eastern bank.

In the weeks immediately before the war, United States and Israeli intelligence received reports of troop concentrations in Syria and the mobilization of some Egyptian reserves. In addition, there were reliable reports that North Korean pilots were flying planes in Egypt.

### Signs Again Dismissed

Once again the signs were dismissed on he grounds that the Egyptians were engaged in annual fall maneuvers, officials said.

In remarks that seemed critical of the intelligence community's performance, Secretary of State Kissinger said in a news conference Oct. 12 that three times in the week immediately preceding the outbreak of war United States and Israeli intelligence agencies had been asked for assessments. They had come back with the conclusion, he said, that "hostilities were unlikely to the point of there being no chance of it."

To Mr. Kissinger, this illustrated "the gravest danger of intelligence assessments"—trying "to fit the facts into existing preconceptions and to make them consistent with what is anticipated." This is a judgment now widely shared in the intelligence community.

United States officials now believe that the Israeli Government knew 24 hours in advance that an Arab attack was imminent but decided not to launch a pre-emptive attack for fear of alienating the United States and other Western nations.

A wide belief in the intelligence community now is that the general Arab plan for war was worked out at the conference of nonaligned nations in Algiers in early September.

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THE WASHINGTON POST DATE 2 Nov 73 PAGE 22

# New Soviet Missiles Believed Sent to Egypt

## Surface-to-Surface 'Scuds' Seen as Potentially Dangerous Escalation

By Michael Getler
Washington Post Staff Writer

U.S. officials say it now appears certain that the Russians have sent Egypt surface-to-surface missiles capable of reaching some Israeli cities.

It is estimated that the Russian "Scud" mobile missiles, which have a range of about 160 miles, are armed with conventional, high-explosive warheads. There is no evidence that nuclear warheads have been shipped.

However, because these weapons can be fitted with either nuclear or conventional warheads, many U.S. officials view their introduction into the Middle East as potentially very dangerous.

Administration sources indicate that the Soviet action already has, or soon will have, provoked expressions of deep concern from very high levels of the U.S. government.

Details on the Soviet shipment and the diplomatic concern about it are said to be matters of "extreme sensitivity" at the moment, with officials largely guessing at the Soviet intentions.

The most benign explanation is that the missiles reflect the momentum of ever-more advanced arms deliveries into the Middle East. On the other hand, the missile's dual capability for both nuclear and conventional warheads could be a Soviet response to the widespread belief that Israel has some operational surface-to-surface missiles of its own.

U.S. intelligence officials say there is little doubt — despite official Israeli denials—that Israel has developed and produced at least some "Jericho" missiles of its own with a range of close to 300 miles, enough to span the Sinai and reach deep into Egypt.

Israel is also widely believed to have the makings for a number of small atomic warheads — though no tests have ever been reported.

On several occasions in the past two years, the United States has turned down Israeli requests to buy U.S. Army Lance missiles. These are short-range (70 miles) weapons that can carry either nuclear or conventional explosive and which are viewed as highly accurate.

The Israelis are expected now to renew their request, but officials say there appears to be no current intention for the administration to comply.

Thus far, sources say, it is not clear precisely how many Soviet Scuds have been shipped, whether they were shipped before the war, or whether Soviet or Egyptian crews are manning them.

If the Soviets are in control, as seems likely , then they may have sent the weapons to ingratiate themselves further with the Egyptians, without the intent of letting the missiles be used unless Cairo were attacked, for example.

While the Soviets have poured billions of dollars worth of tanks, antiaircraft missiles and jet fighters into the Arab countries, until now they have provided very few long-range offensive weapons.

Soviet Mig and Sukhoi fighters and fighter-bombers are generally credited with short range when carrying bombs, and probably have very little chance of getting through Israeli interceptors.

The Soviets have provided some older Tu-16 medium bombers, but these, too, are not likely to get through Israeli defenses.

The Soviet Union, however, has also moved a squadron of more modern Tu-22 bombers into Iraq recently.

Missiles, on the other hand, even if equipped with the equivalent of a 1,000- to 2,000-pound bomb in their noses, can get through. Thus missiles in the Middle East clearly escalate the prospect for more damage.

The Israelis, with U.S. F-4 fighter-bombers, already demonstrated in 1970 that they can strike at areas deep inside Egypt. But the Egyptians, until now, have not had such a capability.

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